Cardozo\u27s  Law and Literature : A Guide to His Judicial Writing Style by Weisberg, Richard H.
Yeshiva University, Cardozo School of Law 
LARC @ Cardozo Law 
Articles Faculty 
2018 
Cardozo's "Law and Literature": A Guide to His Judicial Writing 
Style 
Richard H. Weisberg 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, rhweisbg@yu.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Richard H. Weisberg, Cardozo's "Law and Literature": A Guide to His Judicial Writing Style, 34 349 (2018). 
Available at: https://larc.cardozo.yu.edu/faculty-articles/450 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty at LARC @ Cardozo Law. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of LARC @ Cardozo Law. For more information, 
please contact christine.george@yu.edu, ingrid.mattson@yu.edu. 
 349 
CARDOZO’S “LAW AND LITERATURE”: A GUIDE TO HIS 
JUDICIAL WRITING STYLE 
Richard H. Weisberg* 
In 1925, Benjamin N. Cardozo published an article called “Law 
and Literature” in the Yale Review.1  Although gradually approaching 
its centennial, the essay remains topical. Its first paragraph posits in 
most lawyers and judges an attitude of willful rejection of Law and 
Literature that we still find in many places in the contemporary legal 
landscape, despite a vigorous recent movement inspired by Cardozo:2 
“I am told at times by friends,” the essay begins, “that a judicial 
opinion has no business to be literature.  The idol must be ugly, or he 
may be taken for a common man.”3 
How many lawyers, today in 2018 as well as back in 1925, 
project law and letters into separate spheres, fearing that a joinder will 
somehow diminish law, which must resist it at all costs?  Law, they 
seem to be admitting, is so deeply dependent on language and form 
that any emphasis on the identity of the spheres somehow risks erasing 
the seemingly stronger one.  It’s like twins trying to move away from 
each other precisely because of their similarities—so they deny the 
relation altogether.  Keep as far away as you can from your sister 
discipline, even or especially by eschewing the “aestheticism” in law, 
because the similarities may overwhelm the differences, they seem to 
say.  If you want an “outside” discipline to control law, choose one that 
is very far removed from the everyday practice and language of law.  
Choose, say, law and economics.  This reduces the threat that law will 
once again, heaven forbid, be considered one of the humanities. 
 
*Special thanks to Catherine Weiss for her assistance with this Article. 
1 Benjamin N. Cardozo, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN 
CARDOZO 339-56 (Margaret E. Hall, ed. 1947) (originally published in Yale University Press, 
ed. 1925). 
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 339. 
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The fallacy, or one among many perhaps, is the use of a straw 
man that almost anyone who has thought about Law and Literature—
including Cardozo—would want to upset: a false emphasis on 
“ornament,” imagined as frivolity, embellishment, or an artificial 
overlay of verbiage to make a text seem aesthetically appealing.  But 
the literary relation to law, as Cardozo’s essay emphasizes, has very 
little to do with ornament and everything to do with the everyday use 
of language by lawyers.  For Cardozo, “style” in law counts for much 
more than the imposition of occasional uses of Shakespeare or abuses 
of a thesaurus.  In fact, he argues, attention to the literary is mandatory 
in all acts of legal communication, because style controls meaning; it 
is not added on for fun.  His essay might be sub-titled “How the Law 
Means.” 
For the 19th century French novelist Stendhal, cited before 
Cardozo’s essay’s first paragraph ends, the Code Napoleon was the 
sole example of the perfect style, not of course because it had 
ornamental beauty but rather because, “there alone everything was 
subordinated to the exact and complete expression of what was to be 
said.”4  Stendhal associated with his own literary expression this 
statutory quest for the perfect fit. 
Literary style and legal command must conjoin if the outcome 
of legal pronouncement is to be effective.  Far from an outmoded 
notion, the unity of form and function in law is a universal component 
of legal expression (written or oral); it crosses the generations.  
Although judges in 2017 certainly express themselves differently than 
do judges from earlier times, the central thesis of Cardozo’s essay 
supersedes any “style of the time” idea.5  Cardozo’s central idea—that 
style and substance always merge—is a universal observation about 
writing in the service of justice: 
“Form is not something added to substance as a mere 
protuberant adornment. The two are fused into a unity.”6 
This joining of style and substance thus may or may not involve 
ornament, in the sense of words deliberately chosen to add beauty to 
the product. But it always exists: a bad legal pronouncement fails to 
 
4 See Law and Literature, supra note 1. 
5 See Carlson et al., A Quantitative Analysis of Writing Style on the U.S. Supreme Court, 93 
WASH. U. L. REV. 1461 (2016) (accepting Cardozo’s premise, but then identifying and 
quantifying contemporary judicial styles). 
6 See Law and Literature, supra note 1, at 340. 
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integrate form and substance, and an excellent opinion, oral argument, 
or statute always does so.7 
Cardozo, in elaborating on form, goes on to emphasize not just 
word choice but also the “architectonics” of the judicial opinion.8  By 
this he means the way the writer structures her argument.  The judges 
he reveres map an almost perfect ability to choose their words onto an 
organized elaboration of their thought, word to word, sentence to 
sentence, and paragraph to paragraph. 
As Karl Llewellyn, the great literary author of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, put the same issue somewhat later, understanding 
as a legal codifier himself the novelist Stendhal’s daily readings of the 
Napoleonic code: “[T]he only esthetic rule which I recognize about 
adornment in relation to function is that adornment is best when it can 
be made to serve function, and is bad when it interferes with function.”9 
A literary style in law has to do with achieving the tightest 
possible fit between form and substance; if ornament or choices 
concerning esthetic beauty apply—and only when that is also true—
then literature for law may also contribute to the “beauty” of an opinion 
or other act of legal communication.  In no event are fancy or esoteric 
words mandated—or metaphor or simile—just appropriate word 
choice and structure. 
Some post-Cardozo-era examples of the perfect configuration 
of form to substance have come from the pens and mouths of lawyers; 
some have been relatively spontaneous oral pronouncements.  We 
remember them because they follow the mandate of “Law and 
Literature.” So it helped his client greatly when Oliver North’s 
counsel, Brendan Sullivan, interrupted hostile questioning of his client 
by stating to the interrogator: “Well, sir, I’m not a potted plant”10—or 
when, famously, Boston lawyer Joseph Welch put an end to Joseph 
McCarthy by challenging with perfect verb and noun choices the 
Senator’s abuse of Welch’s younger colleague on national television: 
“Until this moment, Senator, I think I never really gauged your cruelty 
 
7 RICHARD H. WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 
(Columbia University Press ed., 1992). 
8 See Law and Literature, supra note 1, at 352. 
9 Karl Llewellyn, On the Good, the True, the Beautiful, in Law, 9 U. CHI. L. REV. 224, 248 
(1941). 
10 Iran-Contra Hearings; Note of Braggadocio Resounds at Hearing, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 
1987, http://www.nytimes.com/1987/07/10/world/iran-contra-hearings-note-of-braggadocio-
resounds-at-hearing.html. 
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or your recklessness.”11  And Welch went on, hinting as we shall see 
that he was familiar with Cardozo’s stylistics and his stunning opinion 
in Hynes v. New York Central Railroad:12 “Let us not assassinate this 
lad further, Senator.  You have done enough.”13  Form matched 
content, and the coup de grace was accomplished, right there in front 
of millions of Americans.  These lawyers’ statements, because they 
found the right words and structure, moved the audience to their view. 
Cardozo shows us, both in his essay and his opinions, that 
ordinary language is usually up to the task.  Precisely because it takes 
some thought to fit form to substance, most of the lawyers in Cardozo’s 
intended audience dismissively misstate the relation, associating it 
with a floweriness that is no part of the quest.  If they understood it 
better, they would have to commit to a career-long trajectory toward 
better writing that, unfortunately for the profession, many abandon 
early.  Cardozo’s essay is designed to show the bench and bar that they 
have gotten something badly wrong, but the corrective is written with 
a gentleness and humor that perfectly fit the subject. 
Two prominent appellate judges have responded to this central 
theme of Cardozo’s essay, as they have also applied it to Cardozo’s 
own judicial style.  Although both fine writers themselves, neither has 
quite grasped the simplicity of Cardozo’s stylistic approach.  In 1943, 
Jerome Frank spoke of the “alien grace” of Cardozo’s judicial writing.  
So unsure of his description was Frank that he leveled this charge 
anonymously in the Virginia Law Review.14 He was right about 
“grace,” but utterly misguided about “alien.” Cardozo’s opinions 
rarely replace ordinary speech with lofty or ornamental phrases.  Judge 
Posner, more recently, does add to our knowledge of Cardozo’s 
stylistic techniques by emphasizing and praising his “rhetorically 
effective use of irregular word order.”15  For Posner, the structure of 
sentences from Hynes such as “[w]ithout wrong to them, cross-arms 
might be left to rot,”16 creates a loosening of syntax that is far from 
 
11 Executive Sessions of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Committee on Government Operations, Army—McCarthy Hearings, 83d Cong. (1954) 
(statement of Joseph Welch). 
12 131 N.E. 898 (N.Y. 1921). 
13 See supra note 11 (emphasis added). 
14 Anonymous, The Speech of Judges: A Dissenting Opinion, 29 VA. L. REV. 625, 630 
(1943). 
15 RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 51 (University of Chicago Press 
ed., 1990). 
16 Hynes, 131 N.E. at 899. 
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“alien.”17  But in general, Posner’s analysis in Cardozo: A Study in 
Reputation18 adds little to what had been written about Hynes and other 
masterpieces. The book, which many reviewers found to be more about 
Posner’s reputation than Cardozo’s,19 exemplifies perhaps one of 
Cardozo’s less favored styles, the “tonsorial and agglutinative”20 and 
in the most important respect, as we shall see in returning to Hynes, 
misses the main point of the 1925 article. 
As the essay proceeds, Cardozo, with characteristic modesty, 
yields most of the ensuing narrative space to other judicial writers.  But 
his thesis is far from modest: he is saying that every legal utterance we 
make needs to be judged according to the congruence of form and 
substance within it. 
“Law and Literature” identifies six kinds of judicial styles: 
“magisterial or imperative;” “laconic or sententious;” “conversational 
or homely;” “refined or artificial;” “demonstrative or persuasive;” and 
“tonsorial or agglutinative.”21  Cardozo’s praise unambiguously is for 
the first style, though he confesses that changing attitudes have 
rendered it less frequent these days.  He names judges in England and 
America who have moved audiences through the “style magisterial.”  
Cardozo modestly prefers to laud the John Marshall’s and Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s and Lord Mansfield’s of his guild, rather than to 
identify himself with the “style magisterial” he so admires in them (that 
job has been done by others).22  Consistent with the whole essay’s 
theme, he emphasizes that this finest judicial style “eschews ornament” 
and “is meager in illustration and analogy.”23  He continues, “[i]f it 
argues, it does so with the downward rush and overwhelming 
 
17 See POSNER, supra note 15, at 51. 
18 See POSNER, supra note 15. 
19 See more generally about Posner’s “agglutinative” approach to Cardozo’s style: See 
Richard Weisberg, Review Essay “Richard Posner,” by William Domnarski, 29 LAW & 
LITERATURE 507, 513 (2017). 
20 I have written a lot about the case, and Judge Posner picked up on my analysis of it in 
Cardozo: A Study in Reputation. His analysis may be agglutinative but as I said, he adds 
carefully to the appreciative dissection of Cardozo’s techniques. As I did, he stresses not only 
word choice but the “architectonics” of the whole document. As I did, he notes that the “lad 
of sixteen” sharply distinguished the narrative from the impersonality of approach to the 
plaintiff in the far better known Palsgraf. And there is much more that exemplifies Judge 
Posner’s more general view that not too much should be made of seeming plagiarism. See 
Weisberg, supra note 19. 
21 See Law and Literature, supra note 1, at 342. 
22 See, for example the lawyer/novelist Louis Auchincloss’s excellent essay, The Styles of 
Mr. Justice Cardozo, in LIFE, LAW AND LETTERS 47-58 (Houghton Mifflin, ed. 1979). 
23 See Law and Literature, supra note 1, at 342. 
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conviction of the syllogism, seldom with tentative gropings towards 
the inductive apprehension of a truth imperfectly discerned.”24 
Cardozo finds these great predecessors’ style to be exemplary 
not because they deliberately embellish their opinions with fanciness, 
but on the contrary because they fit their declaration of justness within 
a perfect formal setting that is more simple than it is elaborate.  You 
may not be in their league, Cardozo is telling us toilers in the field, but 
if all lawyers understood better the contribution of literature to law, 
improvement would ensue, for all of us, immediately. 
These greats wield pens with an effortless unity of style and 
substance and a complete confidence that what appears will be 
transparent and oracular to the intended audience: “It is thus men speak 
when they are conscious of their power.  One does not need to justify 
oneself if one is the mouthpiece of divinity. The style will fit the 
mood.”25 
Two standard torts opinions by Justice Holmes help 
demonstrate the style magisterial, but only the first ultimately passed 
the Cardozo test of architectonic and verbal perfection, which means 
only that the standard is so high for that style that even Jupiter nods.  
But not in the first case, a pithy one from the Supreme Judicial Court 
of Massachusetts. Goddard was hurt when he tripped and fell on a 
banana peel left on defendant railroad’s platform—he had just 
disembarked, and there were many other passengers on the platform at 
the time.  As Justice Holmes stated, “[t]he banana skin upon which the 
plaintiff stepped and which caused him to slip may have been dropped 
within a minute by one of the persons who was leaving the train. It is 
unnecessary to go further to decide the case.”26 
Forty-one words decide the case, as a matter of law, favorably 
to the defendant.  Olympian pithiness suits the ease with which the 
court dismisses the case, but the average law student reading it might 
have wanted a bit more.  That is as much as to say: every aspect of 
negligence law is implicit in this decision, and it is an obvious one.  
MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND THE LAW, Holmes is telling 
future potential claimants, BEFORE BOTHERING THE COURT 
AGAIN, or—he seems to be saying to law students: learn the law well 
enough to be able to get into the weeds on duty, causation, evidence; 
 
24 See Law and Literature, supra note 1, at 342. 
25 See Law and Literature, supra note 1, at 344. 
26 Goddard v. Boston & M. R. Co., 179 Mass. 52, 52 (Mass. 1901). 
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don’t expect help from me or your professor!  The style magisterial 
leaves that busy work to the group Cardozo labels “sluggard[s].”27 
But in Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Goodman,28 a United States 
Supreme Court opinion, Holmes missed the mark perhaps not so much 
because his powers had diminished as because his audience’s need for 
more detailed explanations of legal rules had increased over time.  
Cardozo’s essay sees this as a progression from the style magisterial to 
a “spirit of cautious seeking;”29 the style is still superb when it formally 
admits it no longer issues “a divine command.”  So off base was 
Goodman’s dictum requiring drivers nearing a railroad track to stop, 
look, listen, and get out of their cars, that Cardozo had to correct his 
stylistic master by over-ruling it in Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co.30 a few 
years later in 1934.  Cardozo might have situated himself among those 
who have “doubts” and sometimes show “cautious seeking” after truth 
for which the form and substance fit is even more important—and the 
results in his own more difficult cases are usually nonetheless dazzling 
for their implied admission of human fallibility.31 
Yet without any doubt, Hynes stands as the greatest appellate 
opinion of all time.  The “lad of sixteen . . . poised for his dive”32 into 
the Harlem River is struck down by the railroad’s carelessly 
maintained wires and flung into the waters below.  Hynes may have 
been a technical trespasser to whom defendant owed no duty.33  The 
legal choice involved closely matched principles, themselves in 
collision.  Cardozo takes that simile—as the boy and wires, so the 
formal rule and the just outcome are in conflict, and through perfect 
architectonics achieves the just result.  The same can be said for 
Palsgraf;34 John Noonan objected, precisely, to that case’s                     
“severe impartiality” leading to one of the judge’s “least humane” 
outcomes.35  But he misses everything in so saying.  Cardozo’s only 
“client” is justice!  So, if in one he humanizes Hynes, but in the other 
he treats Ms. Palsgraf impersonally, it is because the style and form of 
 
27 See supra note 1, at 345. 
28 275 U.S. 66 (1927). 
29 See supra note 1, at 345. 
30 292 U.S. 98 (1934). 
31 See, on this point, Auchincloss, supra note 22. 
32 Hynes, 131 N.E. at 898-99. 
33 Id. 
 34  162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).  
35 Richard H. Weisberg, Law Literature and Cardozo’s Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 283, 294 (1979) (quoting JOHN NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 144 (1976)). 
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the opinion in such difficult cases must match the substance perfectly.  
Both cases were close, and justice required differing outcomes, which 
the form and word choice further and indeed produce. Justice is served, 
and it needed the help of literary technique every step of the way.   
Judge Posner comes closer than these earlier critics to seizing 
Cardozo’s method but ultimately misses the mark, too.  He cites Hynes 
at length: railroads “are not bound to regulate their conduct in 
contemplation of the presence of trespassers intruding upon private  
structures[, but] are bound to regulate their conduct in contemplation 
of the presence of travelers upon the adjacent public ways”36 (it is in 
dispute whether the horizontal extension from defendant’s land made 
the fatal diving board public or private).  Cardozo, grappling with the 
uncertainty of property law, continues: 
Rules appropriate to spheres which are conceived of as 
separate and distinct cannot both be enforced when                 
the spheres become concentric. There must then be 
readjustment or collision. In one sense, and that a 
highly technical and artificial one, the diver at the end 
of the springboard is an intruder on the adjoining lands.  
In another sense, and one that realists will accept more 
readily, he is still on public waters in the exercise of 
public rights.  The law must say whether it will subject 
him to the rule of the one field or the other, of this 
sphere or of that. We think that considerations of 
analogy, of convenience, of policy, and of justice, 
exclude him from the field of the defendant’s immunity 
and exemption, and place him in the field of liability 
and duty.37 
Says Posner of this astounding stylistic move, “[i]n his soaring 
peroration, Cardozo has given no reason why the plaintiff should win.  
Again it is Cardozo the rhetorician, rather than Cardozo the pragmatic 
policy analyst, the sociological jurisprude, whose hand is visible.”38 
But the eyes of this pragmatic and “scientific” judge are shut 
tight.  He cannot see, because his economic formalism will not let him.  
The brilliance of Cardozo’s reasoning. Cardozo has offered reasons, 
not in mathematical progression (one of Posner’s favorite appellate 
 
36 Hynes, 131 N.E. at 900. 
37 Id. 
38 See POSNER, supra note 15, at 53. 
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judges was Learned Hand) but through language and form.  This is 
where a whole avenue of judicial discourse is lacking today, and we 
need to revive it. 
Cardozo in Hynes is by no means, nonetheless, the Holmesian 
Olympian.  He knows this case presents him with an almost 
insuperable barrier. Instead, he knows this case takes him to 
undiscovered legal territory; in The Growth of the Law, he specifically 
recalls that, in Hynes, he was “covering a virgin field.”39  Posner notes 
this reference, still bemoaning, however, a lack of “fundamental 
principles” in the decision.  He wants a formula, maybe an equation.  
But Cardozo’s basic lifelong theme is that justice eludes formulas. 
Justice, as Hynes tells us, needs every ounce of what literature 
has to offer law. Justice is both real and achievable, but you get there 
using the lawyer’s basic tool: language, architechtonics, style.  In hard 
cases, the judge must especially rely on what Cardozo calls her 
“informed intuition” and where that leads her must then be articulated 
through as perfect a fit as possible between substance and form.40  As 
Cardozo said in The Growth of the Law, “[j]ustice in this sense is a 
concept by far more subtle and indefinite than any that is yielded by 
mere obedience to a rule.”41  And in Paradoxes of Legal Science: 
“many are the times when there are no legislative pronouncements to 
give direction to a judge’s reading of the book of life and manners. . . . 
Objective tests may fail him, or may be so confused as to bewilder.  He 
must then look within himself.”42  This jurisprudence may not be what 
a social scientist would desire, but it is quite attractive to the lawyer-
humanist in Cardozo.  He wanted more of this in the profession, and 
this is why he wrote Law and Literature.   
Not every verbal act resulting from judicial self-scrutiny need 
be to our liking; on the contrary—whether it’s Scalia’s tortured 
discovery within the Second Amendment of a personal right to own 
guns43 or Justice Kennedy’s remarkable string of opinions from 
 
39 Benjamin N. Cardozo, Growth of the Law, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN 
CARDOZO 185-251, 203 (Margaret E. Hall, ed. 1947) (originally published in Yale University 
Press, ed. 1963). 
40 See Richard H. Weisberg, Law Literature and Cardozo’s Judicial Poetics, 1 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 283, 305-08 (1979). 
41 Growth of the Law, supra note 39, at 224.   
42 BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 55 (Columbia University 
Press ed., 1930). 
43 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
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Romer44 to Lawrence45 to Obergefell46 that seem to amend the 
Constitution to include a right to “dignity”—the sense of whether 
justice has been achieved varies.  But Cardozo’s essay interjects a sure 
method of figuring things out based on what I have called the 
“poethical fit” or lack of same in the opinion itself.47 
The essayist finds time also, with a minimum of snarkiness, to 
pinpoint less successful but more prevalent stylistic approaches, such 
as the just-referenced “tonsorial and agglutinative.”48  Even cutting and 
pasting, arguably falling short of plagiarism, however has its place in 
legal style.  But whatever style suits the task facing the lawyer, 
whatever voice the writer adopts, the fit is all. 
 
 
44 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
45 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
46 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
47 See WEISBERG, supra note 7. 
48 See supra note 20. 
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